Orientalist Notebook

ASSAD IN PARIS

Syrian President Achieves Diplomatic Coup in Paris as Sarkozy Takes a Diplomatic Gamble

On July 12 French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a four-way press conference with Syrian President Bashir Assad, Lebanese President Imad Michel Sulayman and Qatari Prince Hamid bin Khalifa II which marked a major step in the international rehabilitation of the Syrian president, who among other things is widely considered responsible for an assassination campaign in Lebanon that began with the murder of Rafiq Hariri. Sarkozy is seeking to pull Syria away from Iran through engagement, although the French opposition has been critical - his own socialist foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, is said to be "troubled." (See
La France Aide Assad a monter sur la scene internationale.)

This extended hand to Assad, just before the opening of the Union for the Mediterranean, marks a major break in French foreign policy, which has been cold to Assad since the Hariri killing. Sarkozy could not do this for nothing, and he did extract two concessions from Assad:

• Syria agreed to formally recognize Lebanon through the exchange of ambassadors for the first time since the country's formation over six decades ago, and


• he allowed for the formation of a government in Lebanon, as political paralysis there coincided with continued violence, especially in the Tripoli area. I do not believe that it is a coincidence that the Syrian-aligned opposition reached an agreement to form a new government, after weeks of wrangling, just two days before this meeting.

If Sarkozy succeeds in this, he will be a diplomatic master; otherwise he will come off as a dupe. Either way, Assad has handled this very well. He had previously demanded that a government of "national unity" be formed in Lebanon as a condition of exchanging ambassadors, and this in practice meant institutionalizing its allies within the Lebanese government in order to be able to enforce his "veto" over the Hariri investigation which was the reason for the breakdown of the government back in 2006. As for the exchange of ambassadors, Syria has always claimed that it respected Lebanese sovereignty, so this was a formality, and so in practice one of his "concessions" to Sarkozy was something he wanted anyway (the unity government), and the other was simply a matter of ceremony.

Nevertheless, this is being trumpeted as a triumph of French diplomacy (see Rapprochement diplomatique libano-syrien sous l'égide de la France and Rapprochement «historique» entre la Syrie et le Liban). This is something that the U.S. and others have long demanded of Syria.

French officials even defended Syria against the accusation that it was responsible for the October 23, 1983 Drakkar attack in Beruit that killed 58 French soldiers (Attentat du Drakkar: l'Elysée défend la Syrie). Instead, they insist now, it was Iran that planned and supported the Hizbullah terrorist attack. They do confirm that Syria was culpable in the 1981 attempt on the life of the French ambassador Louis Delamare in Lebanon.

As I have suggested before, I suspect that the current Syrian-Israeli negotiations - which were loudly announced by Syria a couple of weeks before the outbreak of violence in Lebanon - is more than anything a geopolitical PR campaign. There are moves one could look for in Syrian actions collaterally which would indicate a willingness to part with its ally Iran and its sponsorship of various terrorist groups, and I have seen none as of yet. This will certainly be necessary before Israel is willing to even consider parting with the Golan Heights. Yet even talking so much about "la paix au Proche-Orient" ("Peace in the Middle East") is quite helpful to Assad in terms of his international position (see, for example, his interview with Le Figaro,
Bachar el-Assad : «La France doit jouer un rôle direct pour la paix au Proche-Orient»).

The primary implication for this internally for Lebanon is to reinforce the weakness of Imad Aoun, something I've noted over the past few weeks. Aoun wanted to be president of Lebanon, but was blocked from that, and then failed to get a power ministry like defense, interior or finance, and ended up as the new communications minister. This is important in Lebanon, but it is a major step down for Aoun. He struggled for weeks for a better deal, but caved when Assad told him it was time.

A GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON?

Agreement Secured by Giving Aoun Communications Portfolio; Among Opposition Hizbullah Up, Aoun Down

After over a month of wrangling, it appears that this week Lebanon will finally have a government. For about six months it had a government, under Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, but no president, yet since the election of Imad Michel Sulayman, they have had a president but no government, with prime minister-designate Siniora trying to reach a ministry-distribution agreement among the factions of the majority and the opposition. With violence flaring up in various parts of the country, especially Tripoli, pressure has been strong to reach an agreement. The main outline of discussion has been the Imad Aoun Christian faction of the opposition struggling for control of a "power ministry" while their Shia allies, having achieved all they wanted at Doha, sat on the sidelines. The final result seems to show that while Hizbullah is strong, Aoun is not, and he was able to do no better than the Communications Ministry.

This will be the ministry distribution, according to the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida ("Lebanon: The Opposition Decided on their Ministers and the Majority Awaits Hariri's Return; Hizbullah: We Conceded Two Ministries for our Allies"):

• The Majority - finance, education, justice, employment, economics, expatriates, media, environment, culture, management development and tourism.


• The Opposition - foreign affairs, communications, energy, labor, health, agriculture, industry.

The ultimate "power ministries" - defense and interior - are left to the discretion of President Sulayman.

The article notes that the key to the agreement was giving Aoun communications. In most countries this would not be so important, but remember that it was the majority's control of the communications ministry which was key to the recent showdown over Hizbullah's independent military communications network. It didn't do them any good, since Hizbullah had the military power to force them to back down, nevertheless it is an important ministry.

That said, this is a defeat for Aoun even as Hizbullah has been able to sit back, having won its veto right at Doha. Aoun wanted to be president, but didn't get that, then failed to get either defense or interior, so he demanded finance, and the majority refused him that. They offered him foreign affairs, a post which has gone to the Shia in the past, and he didn't seem interested. A report in al-Jarida last week indicated that Aoun might get to appoint a deputy prime minister and have one of his people become foreign minister plus one other. The breakdown published so far doesn't make clear who gets what other than that Aoun gets communications.

Al-Arabiya reported on this without giving the breakdown, and also confirmed that the formal anouncement for the new government is expected mid-week. It, along with other news sources, stated that the major sticking point now will be the "ministerial statement" which outlines the agenda of the government. With new parliamentary elections looming next year, it seems that everyone is positioning themselves for that, especially the Christians, since they are divided between the majority and opposition. The Al-Arabiya report also notes that President Sulayman is expected to take up the issue of Hizbullah's weapons, the most sensitive issue in the country, along with the role of Syria. To my mind Sulayman has shown no indication that he is willing to deal firmly with Hizbullah, but we will have to wait and see.

UPDATES, 06.22.2008

A Regular Feature Updating News on Topics from Recent Posts

Lebanon
Low-level violence continues in Lebanon as the majority and opposition continue to wrangle over cabinet posts. The struggle is over the so-called "power ministries" - defense, interior, finance and foreign affairs. Maronite opposition leader Imad Aoun wants one of them, and the majority isn't budging. They insist that the "consensus president" will appoint defense and interior, and the majority will have finance and foreign affairs. Hizbullah is a involved at the street level, but is not taking part in this power struggle, having already won their right to maintain their private army and veto over future actions by the government, whoever might be in it. This is a struggle between Hizbullah's allies - especially Aoun - and the Siniora-led majority. Siniora is now "prime minister-designate" with no cabinet. It appears - and I'm piecing this together from multiple Arab press reports, not really sure at this time - is that the only power ministry Aoun is being offered is foreign affairs, but he wants finance or one of the security portfolios and the majority is refusing this. What is clear is that President Sulayman will apoint defense and interior, the majority will hold to finance and communications, and Aoun is not happy at all.

Now there is talk of the "overthrow" of the Doha agreement, as violence between allies of the two sides increased in Tripoli over the weekend, an escalation which was accompanied by an increase in violence in the Ayn al-Hilwa Palestinian camp. In Tripoli, to be specific, it is a fight between allies of Hariri and the Alawis, who of course are the same identity group as that which rules Syria, Hariri's main enemy and Hizbullah's ally. Things are not getting better, they are getting worse. Doha is very close to being a dead letter.

Recent related posts -
- Lebanon and the Arab Alignment, May 27
- Beruit Burning, May 11

Iraq
Sadr has a new strategy, and the Washington Post ("Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy") has part of the story. What is missed here - and reported in the Arab media - is that Sadr isn't sitting out the provincial elections, he is simply seeding his supporters as independents through other lists, mainly those of Ibrahim Jaafari and (to a lesser extent) Iyad Allawi, to give them protection from Maliki's intent to ban them. I don't think, as the WaPo article seems to suggest, that they pulled out for fear of loss - Maliki was planning to ban them by law for having a militia. I expect that if provincial elections go forward in October, this will give Jaafari a big boost.

Otherwise, indications of this new tendency in the Iraqi government toward pushing back at Iran as well continue, as Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani, who lived in Iran for years during the Baathist period, has been criticizing Iran over its interference with full control of the Faka oil field, which is near the Iranian border. (source) The government has also moved its military operations to Amara, Maysan, a province in which the Mahdi Army has always been strong. Reports indicate that the Sadrists surrendered their office in the city of Amara without a fight, unlike elsewhere. These operations continue.

Recent related posts -
- Shia Fragmentation Continues, June 13
- Sistani Moves Against U.S. Agreement, June 1

SHIA POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION CONTINUES

Maliki, with Second Political Wind, Still Fails to Negotiate Majority; PM Faces Party Revolt, Fragmenting Base

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki, very nearly voted out of office in March, obtained a second political wind with his strong crackdown on the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army. Yet the restarting of negotiations with Iraq's largest Sunni bloc have broken down again, as he and the Accord Front have failed to agree to a list of new ministers. Maliki has also faced an internal revolt within his own Dawa Party, with a former prime minister taking over many of the party's office. Finally, as provincial elections voting lists are released, it doesn't appear that anyone wants to be associated with the governing United Iraqi Alliance (UIA).

Maliki-Accord: The Negotiation Saga Continues
As negotiations between the Maliki government and the Sunni Accord Front move into their tenth month, they seem to have broken down again. Now the major issue seems to be the Minister of Planning. Remember that when Accord left the government last September, their minister of planning refused to leave, and they kicked him out of the party. Now they want that ministry back, and they want the renegade sent packing, but the UIA says they won't jettison someone who supported the government. I'm still not convinced that they could get a majority in parliament to approve the list of five ministers once it is agreed upon. In addition to defections of independents, Accord appears also to be facing the defection of one of its three main factions (see below). Of its original 44, I doubt it can muster 30 now.

To give a few examples to show the tenor of these negotiations, looking through some of my sources, on May 5 Maliki rejected Accord's six-person list (five ministers and a deputy prime minister), saying, without apparent irony, that he wanted cabinet ministers with qualifications so as to have a "technocrat" government ("Iraqi Government Reservation About Names Submitted by Accord Front," al-Quds al-Arabi). On May 22, al-Hayat reported that negotiations with Accord continued and "are in their final stages and its return is near," something that has been reported probably appeared in 900 headlines since last fall. On May 27 the same source headlined "Accord Front Doubts Maliki's Sincerity in Bringing About Return of Ministers to Govt," and quoted them as saying that they were going to give Maliki two more weeks, or "one last try," something else I've read before. On May 29, the Emirate newspaper al-Ittihad reported on the issue that Maliki continued to block the planning candidate, and quoted an Accord representative as emphasizing that "getting back into the government is not an end unto itself for us, but to have real and effective participation..." That was of course the reason they left - they had ministries, but no real power in government. The May 29 report of al-Hayat included a quote from Tariq Hashemi expressing optimism that Accord would return "within days," confirming what I've noticed for months that while Hashemi's Islamic Party really wants back in the government, the other two factions of Accord less so. Then on May 11, the same source reported that, according to party leader Adnan Dulaimi, the government gave them "no official response" on their most recent proposal, and that "all that has been put forward about us agreeing to their recent proposal is just media statements."

Jaafari's Pustch
On April 5 former prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari led what may be described as a "soft coup" inside the Dawa Party against Prime Minister Maliki, who is nominally its head. According to Iraqi and international Arabic press reports, Jaafari took over Dawa's offices in Najaf and renamed them under the heading of his new faction, the "National Reform Faction." He also took over an unspecified number of party offices in other Shia areas, including the Kathimiya area in Baghdad. Although press reports largely reported that "Dawa Expels Jaafari," it is not clear whether Maliki has expelled Jaafari or Jaafari has expelled him, since the party's Najaf offices are its national headquarters, Jaafari's people have tried to downplay the split since. (The pro-Dawa Buratha News headlined the issue, "Islamic Dawa Party Expels Ibrahim Jaafari and Denies His Membership to Party," whereas al-Hayat headlined the issue more neutrally - "Division in the Dawa Party Leads to Supporters of Jaafari Declaring their Control over Najaf Offices.")

Jaafari's coalition, the National Reform Faction ("Faction" here may be alternatively translated as "Current" or "Tendency"), appears to include about ten current members of the Iraqi parliament, including some unspecified division from the 12 held by Dawa and the 27 UIA independents. There is a further division in Dawa with the Ansar Dawa, so Maliki's contingent in parliament is something well less than 12, making him more dependant than ever on Abd al-Aziz Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Furthermore, Jaafari's group is now aligning itself with a new parliamentary coalition that includes the Sadr faction, Fadhila, Iyad Allawi's Iraqi List, Salih Mutlaq's National Dialogue Front, some independents and the third Accord faction referred to above, Khalf Alyan's National Dialogue Council. I estimate that this new coalition will have around 100-110 seats in parliament, and it will be the parliament's largest, although it remains to be seen whether or not it can replace Maliki.

Provincial Elections
Iraqis have now registered for the provincial elections scheduled for October 1, although parliament has yet to pass the enabling law setting down the ground rules for the elections (i.e. how many districts or seats per province, etc.; see High Commission Expects Postponement of Provincial Elections to Later Time"), but the registration process itself has been illuminating. According to al-Watan ("Political Factions Participate Through Individual Lists in Provincial Elections"), 503 separate lists have registered, including 300 for Baghdad alone. That the Sunni factions would be fragmented, with tribal Awakening (Sahwa) groups running in separate lists against the Sunni political parties now in parliament, is not surprising. Tariq Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic Party in particular has been allowed to have disproportionate weight in national and provincial politics because they ran unopposed in 2005. The Awakening are now eager to run against them, with the contest more heated in Anbar than anywhere.

With the Shia it is a somewhat different matter. Only the followers of Muqtada Sadr boycotted in 2005, and all others are represented at the provincial and national level (the Sadrists are present at the national level, of course, but among the Sunnis the Awakening have no representation at either level). If the governing parties had performed well since that time, then we could expect for candidates to want to run on their lists this time. This is evidently not the case. No one is running under the list of the United Iraqi Alliance, and even Petroleum Minister Hussein Shahristani is running as an independent (the fact that he is running at all is somewhat disturbing, unless he plans to resign his national post). According to a June 13 article in al-Quds al-Arabi ("UIA Factions to Run in Provincial Elections on Individual Lists"), the Dawa Party - Organization of Iraq is also running independently, and in my mind they stopped supporting the government last fall. Of course, as noted above, some Shia candidates are running under Jaafari's group. This is especially a bad reflection on the Supreme Council, which currently controls seven of the nine provinces in the south.

SISTANI MOVES AGAINST U.S. AGREEMENT

Popular Opposition to Long-Term Security Agreement with U.S. Increases with Clerical Support; Sadr Moves to Exploit Fissure

Popular opposition to the long-term military agreement that the Iraqi government is currently negotiating with the United States has been clear for some time, as is the fact the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Najaf hawza would be attempting to block it. On Friday, Muqtada Sadr moved to take advantage of the issue and his followers protested widely, and now the American media has taken notice (see "Growing Opposition to U.S. Security Pact," New York Times, "Sadr Urges Followers to Protest U.S.-Iraq Pact," and "Shiites Across Iraq Protest U.S. Presence,"Washington Post).

While I do not discount the value of having a military pact in place, a successfully negotiated treaty will not be worth much if it cannot be implemented. Part of the problem is a lack of clarity as to precisely what the terms would be (discussed to some degree in the articles linked above), and part is due to the paranoia-mongering which is common in these kinds of debates. Nevertheless, it is looking increasingly likely that any final agreement - whatever its terms - will have a very hard time being approved.

Opposition to the treaty first began to crystallize in January, when 150 members of parliament (275 seats) reached a voting agreement which, among other things, stipulated opposition to a long-term military agreement with the United States. The primary items on the voting agreement related to the Kurds - the Kurdish oil contracts issue and the potential annexation of Kirkuk - but Arabic media reports generally also included this item. Prior to this past week, there were also indirect indications that Sistani and the Iraqi marja'iya was opposed as well. For example, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Iraq at the beginning of March, he had intended to visit Najaf and meet with Sistani, but was turned back. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida al-Jadida, Sistani refused to meet with Ahmadinejad because he didn't want to give the impression that his opposition to the U.S. agreement was due to Iran (other sources simply said that Najaf didn't want Ahmadinejad around). Other sources claiming Sistani was opposed were similarly indirect.

Yet over the past week, prior to the Sadr-organized protest on Friday, it became clear that Sistani was now directly opposing the Iraqi government over the issue, a key fact largely overlooked in U.S. media coverage (the Post article referenced the issue by saying that "Aides to Iraq's most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, have also expressed concerns," which is not really accurate - they are opposing it). The Arab newspaper al-Hayat as followed this closely. Last Thursday, May 29, al-Hayat reported that Sistani told Prime Minister Nuri Maliki during their most recent meeting that he should hold a popular referendum to approve the agreement
(Marja'iya Najaf Demands General Referendum on U.S.-Iraq Agreement). This was a blocking tactic; Sistani knows well that Maliki is unlikely to risk such a referendum, and public knowledge that he was refusing Sistani's demand for a referendum would firm up opposition within parliament (which, as noted above, was a majority anyway). Contrary to what is suggested by the headline of the second Post article linked above, this opposition is not necessarily to U.S. presence per se, but rather to the signing of a long-term security pact. (The Sadrists, of course, are opposed to any U.S. presence per se.)

Sistani's representative in Karbala, Ahmad Safi, used his Friday sermon to make Najaf's opposition to the pact more public and explicit ("Sistani Representative in Karbala: Marja'iya Against Agreement which Limits Future Generations," al-Hayat, May 31). The article noted that Sistani was not only opposed this agreement, but favored removing Iraq from Article 7 of the UN Charter, which limited its sovereignty. A separate article published the same day ("Hakim Confirms Negotiations with Washington have not Reached a Final Result and Hashemi Warns Against Crossing 'Red Lines'") quoted Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and Tariq Hashemi, the country's most important Shia and Sunni politicians, respectively, as saying that the agreement was necessary but that they were opposed to certain elements put forward by American negotiators. So even those who favor the treaty are on the defensive.

Two additional considerations relating to the current political environment should be borne in mind.

First, Sadr may be able to use this issue to end his political isolation among Iraqi factions. During the recent and ongoing government operations against the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army, all the Sunni factions Sadr had been trying to court supported the government against him, and the Shia factions that weren't supporting the campaign essentially stood aside. No one stood with him. Sadr is enough of a problem when working against the Shia clerical establishment; now he is working with the wind to his back.

Second, Maliki's political base is extremely narrow, and he is in no position to push an unpopular treaty through parliament, much less mount a national referendum. His government has been a minority in parliament since last September, and attempts at negotiating a new governing majority have repeatedly failed. I estimate that only about 100 members of the 275-seat parliament support him generally. This would be an uphill fight.

LEBANON AND THE ARAB ALIGNMENT

Doha Agreement a Victory for Hizballah, Iran and Syria; Damascus Secures 'Veto' Over Hariri Investigation

As the dust settles from the recent violence in Lebanon - some of which is still being kicked up - the implications of the Doha agreement between Hizballah and the Lebanese majority have become clearer. Hizballah won this round, while Iran and Syria - especially the latter - where the primary beneficiaries among outside powers. The primary element of Hizballah's victory was political - they gained the "minority veto" that they had sought originally when leaving the Lebanese cabinet in 2006, allowing them to block the international investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, a priority above all for Damascus. This will have to be balanced against the harm Hizballah has done to its standing in the Arab world by using its "weapons of resistance" against other Arabs.

On the other hand, this has created a crisis of confidence among Lebanon's Sunnis and a sense of defeat among Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which supported the Siniora government. It also demonstrated the weakness of the United States in Lebanon.

The Doha Agreement and the Lebanese Domestic Scene
Last week's agreement in Doha, Qatar was preceded by a clear victory by Hizballah on the ground - the majority was forced to back down on its two decisions severing Hizballah's independent communications network and its control of Hariri International Airport (through a military officer loyal to them). The agreement resolving the conflict - for now - had three key elements:

• The election without delay of Imad Michel Sulayman as president of Lebanon by consensus.
• A three-fold division of the new cabinet with 30 members: 16 for the majority (Sunnis, Christians and Druze), 11 for the opposition (Hizballah plus the Christian faction of Imad Aoun), and three to be appointed by the president.
• The opposition, namely Hizballah, would be granted a "blocking third," or a veto over cabinet decisions. This is absolutely key because it means that Hizballah will be able to protect Syria from investigations into the assassinations of Lebanese public figures, most prominently Hariri.

Hizballah conceded nothing in these negotiations. Although there was a clause prohibiting the use of weapons by Lebanese factions against other Lebanese, this had been Hizballah's position previously anyway, and the issue of its weapons was otherwise kept off the agenda.

Sulayman was duly elected president by the Lebanese parliament on Sunday, May 25, with near unanimity. In his acceptance speech, he hit the key points of each faction - the importance of the Hariri investigation, the unacceptability of sectarian violence among Lebanese, the viability of the "resistance" against Israel. The phrase repeated over and over by Sulayman and others was ma ghalib wa ma maghlub - no victor and no vanquished, an ironic statement since Hizballah's emblem includes the phrase f'in hizballah hum al-ghalibun - "For Hizballah are the Victors."

Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's speech the next day left no doubt, if there was room for any. Lasting approximately an hour and ten minutes, Nasrallah set forth a historical narrative intended to show that Hizballah's strategy of armed action against Israel and the United States was the only valid option open to Arabs and Muslims. Repeatedly affirming his loyalty to Iran and the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (Khomeini's system of clerical rule), Nasrallah spoke from a position of strength, saying that Hizballah moderated its demands in Lebanon because it chose to, not because it needed to. In emphasizing that it retained its weapons to liberate Palestine and free Hizballah's prisoners in Israel, Nasrallah reminded his countrymen that he retained the right to drag Lebanon into another war with Israel that they did not want (the Hizballah attack on Israel setting off the 2006 had been to capture Israeli soldiers and use them to negotiate a prisoner swap). This did not go over well in Lebanon.

* Full text of Nasrallah speech, May 26, 2008

Regional Alignment: The Empowerment of the Tehran-Damascus Axis
The regional alignment in the Arab world has pitted U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, Egypt and most of the rest of the Arab League in support of Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora's government against Iran and Syria, whose non-state proxies include Hizballah (most importantly), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the "rejectionist" secular Palestinian terror groups. These events have demonstrated that the latter have the upper hand in Lebanon.

One of the clearest statements of support from the Sunni side for Hizballah came from Jordan's Islamic Action Front, a sister organization to Hamas, where 63 of their prominent members signed a statement supporting the Shia group. This is not surprising, since the IAF has voiced support for Syria in the past - against its sister organization the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood - although it is notable given the current sectarian tensions (yet this support was not unanimous, see "Former Secretary General of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood: Hizballah Loses Legitimacy of Role and Weapons," al-Quds al-Arabi, May 21, 2008; see also this article, which refers to their support more obliquely; I initially saw this reported on al-Arabiya but couldn't find a page on their site to source).

Abd al-Bari Atwan, the editor of al-Quds al-Arabi, spoke for many Sunnis who support anyone who opposes the United States in writing (see May 9 op-ed, "Round of Violence Enlarges in Lebanon"):

...There is a consensus among the alliance of the moderates [a sarcastic reference to U.S. allies] on the need to eliminate the resistance and its weapons in Lebanon, and meeting with it in this regard are America and Israel, so one cannot rule out that they might have suggested this action to incite Hizballah to action by their allies which they constitute the constitutional legitimacy in Lebanon...

Yes, Hizballah is supported by Iran, and so is Hamas, and if Iran has achieved dominance in Lebanon from the former, and a foothold in Palestine through the latter, this shows the weakness of Arabs at the official level and their complicity with the American project, and their lack of any real project to return to the Arabs the power they have lost, and the support of the Islamic nation. So there is an Iranian project, and a Turkish one, and third an Indian one, and fourth a Chinese one, but no Arab project at all...

Bear in mind that the dominate reaction among Sunni Arabs has been against Hizballah, but I believe that this points to an important division between those Sunnis who think ideologically and those whose views are based more on identity. For most, their natural sympathy is with the Sunnis of Lebanon. For activists and intellectuals who view the world through the lens of fighting America and Israel, Iran's role in the region is not a good thing to itself, but is worth supporting as a means of opposing the other side.

As for the "alliance of the moderates," Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud Faisal was exceptionally blunt. As quoted in al-Watan, he stated that "what happened in Lebanon was planned beforehand..." by Syria and Iran, who stand "behind the bloody coup and assassination attempt to which Lebanon and the entire region has been subjected" in an attempt to turn Lebanon into a "second Gaza." Saud Faisal was further quoted as saying of Iran that this could have "a negative impact on its relations with all Arab states..." ("Faisal: Iranian Support for Hizballah Coup will Negatively Affect its Relations with Arabs, May 14, 2008.) That is an understatement.

The importance of this statement is not its content - Saudi newspapers owned by members of the royal family say things like this often - but the fact that such a senior Saudi royal said so himself. Iran has shown its power in Lebanon, Syria has achieved the blocking veto it needs to stymie the Harriri investigation, but these events have also cost Hizballah the support it gained from the Sunni world in the wake of the 2006 war with Israel. Moreover, Syria has made a rapproachement with the Arab world all the more distant, and Iran has inflammed anti-Iranian sentiment in the Arab world. It is not a coincidence that in the wake of this Iranian victory, the UAE chose to reopen its fight with Iran over the three contested islands, comparing "Iranian occupation" to "Israeli occupation" of Palestine. It remains to be seen whether the short-term benefit outweighs the long-term consequences they face as a result.

BERUIT BURNING

The Crisis in Context; Hizballah versus Druze and Sunnis, with Christians on the Sidelines

The current crisis in Lebanon, currently five days old, has shown the power of Hizballah in the country - and vicariously, that of Iran and Syria. While today things have quieted down in Beirut itself, violence has flared in Tripoli, red lines have been crossed, Hizballah continues its confrontation, and the Sunnis in particular have been thrown into their greatest crisis since 1979. I would like to provide some context to the current crisis, explain why it was nearly inevitable, and discuss some key events of the past two days.

A Crisis in the Making
The current political alignment in Lebanon was set in late 2004 as former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri decided to run for prime minister on a Lebanese independence platform, opposing another term for Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who is a puppet of Syria. Hariri was assassinated in early 2005, with the UN-sponsored Mehlis Report later publishing details of Syria's complicity in the murder at high levels. This led to an alignment of Sunnis, Christians and Druze against the Shia, represented by Hizballah and Amal, aligned with Syria and Iran. This configuration was modified somewhat when the Christian leader Imad Mishal Aoun broke with the "March 14 Forces" (so called because of a massive anti-Syrian protest on March 14, 2005) and sealed an alliance with Hizballah in exchange for its support - and thus impliedly, Syria's - for him becoming president. About a year and a half ago, the "Opposition" - as they are usually referred to in the Arab press - left the government and pulled out of parliament, throwing the government into a stalemate and preventing the parliament from achieving a quorum.

This stalemate came to a head in November 2007 when Lahoud's term came up, and the majority of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora was unable to elect a new president because of this lack of a quorum (assassinations reduced the majority to a handful of seats, and while the Lebanese constitution allows for an election by simple parliamentary majority after the first attempt, the opposition has blocked this). This has left the country with an institutional void, and in February reports began to appear in the Arab press that the sectarian groups were rearming themselves in case of a renewed civil war. Each month Siniora would call parliament to meet, and each time it would fail to achieve quorum.

The Arab League intervened with great fanfare in January with a compromise proposal by which the head of the army, Imad Michel Sulayman, would be elected president by consensus, along with a new agreement on cabinet appointments. The Syria-aligned parties blocked this, demanding simultaneous agreement on appointments in the military as well as the civilian government.

The threat of civil war became more clear when in March when Saudi Arabia ordered all its citizens out of the country. Later that month the annual Arab League meeting was held in Damascus, and about half the Arab countries - including Saudi Arabia and Egypt - boycotted in protest.

Crossing the Red Lines: Majority Exerts Sovereignty and Hizballah Seizes Beirut
I have been following this sequence of events continually through the Arab satellite channels and will supplement that with a long piece in al-Hayat published on Sunday which covered most of the events of the weekend, including Siniora's speech to the nation ("Most Violent Affrontments in the North, Tragic Event in the Capital Before 'Initiative' of Sulayman... Mualim Skips Arab League Meeting and Warns Against 'International Intervention'...Beruit in the Hands of the Army"). U.S. media coverage has also been better here than is usually the case in Iraq, so I've linked to news reports below.

This recent escalation got rolling early last week with Druze leader Walid Junblatt's press conference in which he revealed that Hizballah had maintained a parallel communications system in Beirut and that the senior officer in change of security at Rafiq Hariri International Airport - Colonel Wafiq Shaqir - was loyal to Hizballah. He called on the government to prevent Iranian flights into Lebanon. My understanding is that the existence of these things was known previously, but that the government had chosen not to confront the issue until now.

The government reacted with two decisions - to remove Shaqir from his post and close Hizballah's communications network in Beirut. Hizballah reacted with fury. Hizballah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah gave a fiery address on Wednesday in which he vowed that Hizballah would not use the weapons of "resistance" against Lebanese, but that it would "cut off the hand" of any faction which acted against it. Immediately after the speech, Shia gunmen from both Hizballah and Amal effectively seized Beirut by fanning out from their stronghold in the southern suburbs, taking control of Sunni areas, shutting down the international airport and blocking roads into the city. They also attacked besieged the private compounds of Saad Hariri and Walid Junblatt, attacking a "Mustaqbal" (Future) television station and forcing it off the air by threatening employees elsewhere. (Mustaqbal is owned by Hariri; I watch it at times and knew it was down - by Sunday night it was down for four days.) Hizballah called for Siniora's resignation. The fact that the government's decision to face down Hizballah on this issue coincided with a labor strike against it for failure to agree to wage demands put the govenrment in an especially precarious position.

The Sunni mufti Shaikh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani responded with a statement broadcast across the Arab world - the Sunnis of Lebanon were under attack, and he called upon Arab countries to come to their aid. Arab commentators started using words like ghazwa ("attack," usually reserved for the U.S. invasion of Iraq) and ihtilal ("occupation," usually applied to Israel) to describe Hizballah's actions in Beruit. Hariri gave a televised speech from his compound - later seconded by Junblatt - calling for his followers to surrender their positions to the army rather than fight Hizballah, and entrusting the city to "the guardianship of the army."

On Saturday, Prime Minister Siniora spoke to the nation for the first time. He strongly condemned Hizballah, emphasizing the he had never called for the disarming of Hizballah by force and asking sarcastically, "have the Israeli settlements in Palestine been moved to Beruit?" He noted that the two decisions which set off the fight had not been implemented, and set forth three positions -

• that the two decisions be placed on hold and entrusted to the army,
• that the army immediately move to restore order, which meant that Hizballah would have to retreat from Sunni areas or face attack, and
• the election of Sulayman as president on the basis of consensus immediately.

Violence also spread over the weekend to the Druze area near Beruit, where there as a Druze-Shia fight, and to Tripoli in the north of the country, in which Sunnis attacked Allawis (the Syrian government is dominated by Allawis). Christians largely stayed out of direct confrontation, although Geagea joined Junblatt in supporting any decision made by Siniora and Hariri, while Hizballah-ally Aoun stayed silent at first and then came out with what appeared to me to be a very evasive press conference.

This leaves the Lebanese military holding the balance of power in the country. Many were disappointed with the army's failure to prevent Hizballah from seizing control of Sunni areas, attacking individuals and damaging property. While the army clearly wanted to maintain neutrality in order to avoid desertion by Shia soldiers, some warned that its failure to protect others posed the opposite problem. On Sunday Beirut was quieter while violence continued in the north. Since 1989 the Sunnis, Christians and Druze have relied on the army to protect them from Shia militants. All eyes will be on the military from this point onward to see if it can hold itself, and the country, together.

- Clashes in General Strike in Lebanon, New York Times
- Hizballah Seizes Swath of Beirut, New York Times
- Opposition Seizes Most of Beirut, Washington Post
- Lebanon Struggles to Defuse Crisis, Washington Post

Implications
In the short to medium term, this is a victory for Hizballah, Syria and Iran, albeit a limited one. Hizballah appears to have succeeded in preventing the government in this attempt to establish sovereign control over the country, and has shown itself to be the country's most powerful force, cast doubt on the reliability of the military, and thrown the Sunnis into a deep crisis of confidence. Yet it will take more to achieve Syria's goal of destroying the Siniora government. Hizballah scored a psychological victory without suffering material damage - in contrast to the 2006 war with Israel, which was a psychological victory with significant material loss - and that is what is most important for Iran. In that sense, Iran is more a winner here than Syria.

The long-term implications are less clear. Hizballah has crossed a red line in using its weapons of "resistance" against fellow Lebanese, and the fact that they did so within hours of Nasrallah saying they would never do so adds to the damage. I suspect that Aoun, Hizballah's Christian ally, has also been damaged. The Sunni attacks on the Allawis in the Tripoli area just underscore the breadth of the chasm between the factions. And that does not bode well for the future of Lebanon.

The past week has clearly demarcated the new balance of power in the country - away from the Christians, toward the Shia and with the Sunnis holding the balance. This was clear enough before, but is much more explicit now. The Sunnis themselves also face a crisis of confidence, having seen themselves helpless in the face of Shia aggression, with the military slow to respond. Saad Hariri was probably wise to avoid direct armed confrontation with Hizballah, but holed up in his compound it looked to some like a loss of nerve all the same. The shoes of his father are large indeed.

As for the Siniora government, there is every indication that it will hang on for the time being, and it enjoyes strong support from the rest of the Arab world. Hizballah is essentially a state within a state, and a sovereign state has the right to take the actions Siniora took. But the decision to force the issue at this time, with an institutional void and a general strike called by the labor unions on unrelated economic bases seems especially unwise. It will be hard to avoid an embasssing climb-down at this point.

AFTER BASRA

The Political Factors Behind the Basra Operation; New Complications for Iran

While fighting continues between U.S.-Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and Basra, the aftermath of April's pitched battle between Iraq's central government and the Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army is turning out rather differently than most expected. While the initial reaction in the U.S. media was to paint Sadr as the victor after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki's initial drive fell short, this failed to take two things into consideration. One, Sadr's ceasefire order to his militia included demands on the Iraqi government, but the ceasefire was unilateral, and the government was not obligated to accede to even a single demand for the Mahdi Army to stand down. Two, "Operation Knight's Attack" - as Maliki dubbed the offensive - has reaped a strong benefit for the Iraqi prime minister, as Sadr finds himself almost entirely isolated with Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions supporting the weak Maliki government.

Background - Maliki's Political Weakness & and the Antecedents the Basra Offensive
In order to understand the aftermath of Basra as it affects the Iraqi political landscape, some background is necessary.

Maliki's government lost its majority last August after the largest Sunni party, the Accord Front (44 seats), withdrew from the government (although two ministers did not withdraw). He also lost the support of Iyad Allawi's Iraq List (23 seats at the time, 19 now due to defections). From September to December, Maliki's strategy was to regain a majority by getting the Sunnis to return to the government, but without accepting a redistrubution of power over the security services, one of the major reasons for the rupture. At the same time, the government - especially the Supreme Council-dominated provincial security services - were cracking down hard on the Mahdi Army. The main factor keeping Maliki in office was the fact that Accord was not willing to vote for "no confidence" because that would have meant new elections, and Accord would have faced an electoral wipeout running against the Sahwa "Awakening" tribal movements, which were then forming their own political fronts. So Maliki had a minority government, but he was institutionally strong because his United Iraqi Alliance held four of the five "power" ministries - Interior, Defense, Oil and the prime minister's office itself.

The ground seemed to be moving under the government's feet by late December, however. The Sunnis refused to reenter the government without a complete cabinet reshuffle - they did not demand Maliki's resignation, only saying that a change in prime minister should be "on the table" - and then Mahdi Karbala'i, the Ayatollah Sistani's representative in Karbala, issued a "no confidence"-like statement saying that most ministers were not qualified and should either start performing or resign. Maliki's Shia support in parliament had collapsed from 128 seats to probably about 60. There were almost daily news reports of negotiations to reshuffle the cabinet, but by March with no progress in sight, the Accord Front's leader, Abd al-Karim al-Samara'i, said Accord was willing to vote for new elections, which would mean Maliki's downfall as soon as parliament came back into session in late March. Maliki launched the Basra offensive within a matter of days after parliament had done so, and the Sunni factions put aside their differences and vowed to support Maliki in his attack on Sadr's Shia militia.

The Basra Operation, the Mahdi Army and the Iranian Role
The military aspects of "Knight's Attack" have been covered reasonably well in the English-language media. (For background, see for example The Iraqi Army Takes Last Basra Areas from Mahdi Army, New York Times; Sadr Warns of 'Open War' If Crackdown Continues Washington Post). Fighting has continued, especially in Sadr City in Baghdad, because that Shia sector is being used to mortar the Green Zone, while the government campaign against the Mahdi Army continues in the Shia provinces.

One point about the fighting itself needs to be clarified. The New York Times article linked above states of Sadr,

But it was difficult to tell whether his words posed a real threat or were a desperate effort to prove that his group was still a feared force, especially given that his militia’s actions in Basra followed a pattern seen again and again: the Mahdi militia battles Iraqi government troops to a standstill and then retreats. Why his fighters have clung to those fight-then-fade tactics is unknown.

I don't think this is hard to understand. The Mahdi Army has never been a death cult like al-Qaeda. Like Muqtada's illustrious forbearers, his uncle Muhammad Baqir Sadr and father Muhammad Sadiq Sadr, Sadrists have made clear they are willing to suffer death without ever seeking it. Sadrists believe that the Mahdi will return to Iraq soon and then form a world government which will abolish injustice. But the Mahdi needs people to fight for him - thus the name of Sadr's militia - and so they seek to stay alive if they can. Their strategy has always been to try to outlast the American presence and live to fight another day.

Evidence of Iranian support for Shia militias has been as prevelant as ever in recent weeks, but there has been a noted change in the willingness of Shia Iraqi security officials to speak openly about it. At a regional conference in Damascus on April 14, the Iraqi delegation openly blamed Iran for "shipping weapons across the border," while Iran criticized Iraq for not clamping down on the MEK, an armed anti-regime Iranian group (Iraqi Official Demands Investigating Commission in Regard to Iranian Role in Basra, al-Hayat). A spokesman for the Iraqi defense ministry has directly accused Iran of supporting militias, and local security officials have as well, as on April 29 when local police in Karbala found Iranian-made weapons in a cache there (see al-Quds al-Arabi, "Iraqi Police Discover Iranian Explosives West of Karbala"). What makes this increased outspokenness significant is that these security services are controlled by Shia Iraqis, with Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's Supreme Council - founded in Iran - the dominant element. While reasons for skepticism remain, this is evidence that their conversion to Iraqi nationalism and Shi'ism - not the Iranian, Khomeinist brand - may be genuine.

Renewed Cabinet Negotiations, but the Same Refrain
The anti-Sadr operations have at least temporarily breathed new life into the Maliki government. Over the past three weeks there has been increasing talk of the Sunni Arabs rejoining the government, but the refrain from January and February has remained - Sunnis say they want to come back in the government, but the UIA refuses to share decision-making authority or deliver on promises, so nothing happens. Since mid-April the return of Accord has been reported as essentially imminent, but the discussions have involved simply giving Accord their five ministries back, not a redivision of power in the security services, which they have always demanded. I suspect that is why nothing is happening. Also, according to al-Hayat, Accord is now saying the government is failing to fulfill its pledge in implementing the new amnesty law - the passage of which was one of Accord's main demands. Furthermore, they can't just put Accord's members back in the cabinet, since they resigned, there must be a majority vote in parliament. Yet this is hindered by the fact that Accord has suffered nine defections since February - thus having only 35 seats - and Maliki does not appear to have appreciably increased his Shia support in parliament. So even if Accord agrees, I put the chance of confirmation at 50/50.

One clear lesson "After Basra" is how isolated Muqtada Sadr has become, and how his strategy in Iraq has failed so utterly. Some writers like to say that Sadr is underestimated and that he has learned from his early mistakes, but his lack of institutional power is due to errors of judgment he has made since that time, and his lack of allies is due to the Mahdi Army's death squads. He still has street power, especially in Baghdad and Basra, so he is a force to be reckoned with. But he doesn't have much else, and he is stuck in Iran - not a good place for an alleged Iraqi nationalist to be.

BLOGGING TO RESUME SOON FOLLOWING BREAK

Unfortunately, the launch of this blog has been effectively delayed by a residence move which I have just completed this week. I intend to be publishing something soon.

KHS

NOTE ON ARABIC NEWS SOURCES

On this blog I frequently quote from Arabic-language media sources which may be unfamiliar to many readers. This post is intended as a guide to some of the more important ones which readers may want to bear in mind when considering the potential for source bias. When quoting other sources, I'll describe any relevant affiliation at that point, but will otherwise not do so for these primary sources.

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Al-Alam: Iran's Arabic language satellite channel, based out of Beirut and Tehran. Mainly useful for decoding Iranian foreign policy in the Arab world.

Al-Arabiya: Saudi-owned satellite television channel run out of the United Arab Emirates. Strongly anti-terrorist; primary competitor to the more well-known al-Jazeera.

BBC Arabic: Despite being British-owned, tends to play to its audience in terms of bias, like the radio version, although the TV version has a higher hard-news content. Sleek and well-run, it will likely be a strong competitor to the Arab channels.

Al-Hayat: International daily based in London owned by the son of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz. Secular, Arab nationalist orientation. Coverage focus is Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Al-Ittihad: Highly sophisticated UAE daily with strong coverage of economic and local issues important to the government.

Al-Jarida al-Jadida: Kuwaiti daily news paper. Government-aligned.

Al-Jazeera: Qatar-based satellite television channel; the most widely watched Arabic-language news source in the world. Strongly Arab nationalist with heavy coverage of Palestinian issues.

Al-Riyadh: Major domestic Saudi daily. One of about a half dozen domestic Saudi newspapers which although privately-owned are carefully watched by the government. Since they are all essentially identical in coverage and highly dependent on the Saudi Press Agency for news, it is only necessary to read one of them.

Al-Sharq al-Awsat: International daily based in London, owned by the son of Riyadh Governor Salmon bin Abd al-Aziz. The most prominent "liberal" Arab daily, with the most neutral coverage of the U.S.

Al-Qabas: Kuwaiti daily newspaper. Primary focus is Kuwaiti and Persian Gulf issues.

Al-Quds al-Arabi: Palestinian-owned international daily based in London. Strongly anti-American, provides generally reliable coverage with a bias in favor of movements hostile to the U.S. and Israel across the board, both secular and Islamic, from the Baath to Hamas and al-Qaeda. Topically, focuses most heavily on Palestinian news, with broad coverage across the Arab world.

Voices of Iraq News Service: Independent and non-partisan Iraqi news service.

Al-Watan: Domestic Saudi daily owned by the son of former Saudi King Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz; considered the country's daily "liberal" newspaper.